Electoral competition and special interest politics

  • 32 Pages
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by
National Bureau of Economic Research , Cambridge, MA
Political campaigns -- Mathematical models., Campaign funds., Pressure gr
StatementGene Grossman, Elhanan Helpman.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper no. 4877, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 4877.
ContributionsHelpman, Elhanan., National Bureau of Economic Research.
The Physical Object
Pagination32 p. ;
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL22421025M

We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament. The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign Cited by: Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics GENE M.

GROSSMAN Princeton University and ELHANAN HELPMAN Tel Aviv University and CIAR First version received November ; final version accepted November (Eds.) We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties. Get this from a library.

Electoral competition and special interest politics. [Gene M Grossman; Elhanan Helpman; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- Abstract: We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament.

The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed. Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics.

acteristics and Electoral Competition." Journal of Politics we emphasize quid pro quo and informational issues in special interest politics and highlight crucial open questions.

Downloadable (with restrictions). We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions.

In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and. Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics Gene M.

Grossman. Princeton University. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic. Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol Issue 2, AprilPages – Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics.

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Review of Economic Studies,vol. 63, issue 2, Abstract: We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions.

They proceed to add additional interest groups, a legislature with several independent politicians, and electoral competition between rival political parties. The book is organized in three parts. Part I focuses on voting and elections. An excellent theoretical book on special interest politics.

BibTeX @ARTICLE{Grossman96electoralcompetition, author = {M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman and Gene M. Grossman}, title = {Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {}}. This paper characterizes the solution to differential games in the context of electoral competition between two political parties/politicians, in the presence of voters and a special interest group.

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Electoral competition and special interest politics in SearchWorks catalog Skip to search Skip to main content. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages References listed on IDEAS as. Get this from a library.

Electoral competition and special interest politics. [Gene M Grossman; Elhanan Helpman; National Bureau of Economic Research.]. competition. This competition takes various forms. The most obvious form is the competition among political parties. At the constituency level, it takes the form of competition among several candidates.

If there is no competition, elections will become pointless. But is it good to have political competition.

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Clearly, an electoral competition. Despite the increased competition caused by term limits, greater political party turnover was found in the non-term limited open seats, where 19% switched parties, as opposed to the term-limited open seats were 12% switched parties.

In sum, this book discovers that elections have become less s: 2. “Was it a mistake to create the Electoral College. Jesse Wegman argues that it was. This timely and erudite work should interest all who are interested in the future of the United States.” —Annette Gordon-Reed, author of The Hemingses of Monticello “Jesse Wegman’s urgent and ultimately irrefutable call to action is the most readable and fully informed explanation of how the Electoral.

When the length of the electoral period is given (that is, the date of election is known), Nordhaus [] relies on a discount factor, \(\mu \), which is positive, and calls it a decaying memory, where the recent pains are more painful than the tini [] also uses the discount factor \(\rho \) in the value function as negative and refers to the future date as more relevant than today.

They proceed to add additional interest groups, a legislature with several independent politicians, and electoral competition between rival political parties. The book is organized in three parts. Greater electoral competition could reduce policy distortions but this, in turn, sparks more intense lobbying thereby increasing the scope of misappropriation of funds.

In the case of multiple lobbying, political parties either demand different levels of campaign contributions or leave them with different levels of satisfaction.

The book concentrates on the real world 'politics', as well as the 'political science' of electoral systems. The book will be of interest to those concerned with the practical political business of electoral reform.

The book contains a wealth of evidence about the performance of various kinds of proportional representation and of non-PR systems.

the electoral competition, for the extent to which protest and electoral politics relate to each other, (b) showing that parties’ involvement in protests differs across political contexts.

In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. This is what electoral competition does.

Regular electoral competition provides incentives to political parties and leaders. They know that if they raise issues that people want to be raised, their popularity and chances of victory will increase in the next elections. But if they fail to satisfy the voters with their work they will not be able.

It is the only book with an impressively broad coverage of the electoral system that includes parties, elections, and interest groups. No other text so well integrates political history, nuts-and-bolts politics, and major theories about electoral behavior and the electoral : $ Elections are all about political competition.

This competition takes various forms. At the constituency level, it takes the form of competition among several candidates.

Here are a few reasons that support political competition as being good for people. Regular electoral competition provides incentives to political parties and leaders.

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Electoral Competition and Optimal T ariffs. Miaojie Y u 1. Department of Economics. University of California-Davis. Our last interest is both parties’ vote shares in the equilibrium. From. Contributing to the growing discourse on political parties in Asia, this book looks at parties in Southeast Asia’s most competitive electoral democracies of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

It highlights the diverse dynamics of party politics in the region and provides new insights into organizational structures, mobilizational strategies and the multiple dimensions of linkages.

What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles.

A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions.5/5(2). The book will be of great interest to decision makers, comparative politics researchers, and area specialists.

Highly recommended." S.A. Kochanek, emeritus, Pennsylvania State University, University Park Campus, CHOICE. Hutchcroft, who has studied Philippine politics since the martial law era, was among the speakers at the launch in Quezon City.

The book was published by The Asia Foundation and Anvil Publishing Inc. He also wrote a chapter in the book, which examines the problems with the country’s electoral system and the ways that it could be reformed. J.E. HarringtonThe revelation of information through the electoral process: An exploratory analysis Economics and Politics, 4 (), pp.

Google Scholar.CHAPTER 4: ELECTORAL POLITICS. MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS [1 MARK] Q Who led the ‘Nyaya Yudh’?

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(a) Chaudhary Charan Singh(b) Chaudhary Devi Lal (c) Ajit Singh(d) None of these. QWhat was the promise Devi Lal made to the farmers and small businessmen? (a)He would waive the loans of farmers and small businessmen.